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Abstract
We study asset liquidity in a search-theoretic framework where divisible assets
can facilitate exchange for an indivisible consumption good. The distinctive charac-
teristics of our theory are that the asset dividend can be either positive or negative
and buyers can choose whether or not to carry the asset and trade for the indivisible
good. Buyers’participation determines the demand for asset liquidity. Thus, the
asset price carries a liquidity premium component which reflects the function of the
asset in facilitating trade. The economy features multiple equilibria when the asset
dividend is negative, due to the trade-off between the probability of trade and the
endogenous cost of holding assets.
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1 Introduction
Assets, just like money, can convey liquidity for consumption purposes. Investors value
assets for their fundamental value measured in dividend yields as well as valuing assets
for their liquidity function. One example of such assets is the US Treasury bill. As
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) point out, asset holders are willing to pay
a premium of up to forty-six base points for the liquidity attribute of US Treasuries. In a
growing literature based on the New Monetarist framework of Lagos and Wright (2005),
this liquidity function of assets has been modeled as the essential medium of exchange in
a market with trading frictions.
We examine an economy in which buyers can hold divisible assets and use them to buy
one unit of indivisible consumption good from sellers in a frictional market. We focus on
asset liquidity and our analysis differs from the previous studies in three aspects. First,
the good that buyers want to trade assets for is indivisible. The divisibility of goods
(or discrete multi-units) is a convenient abstraction at the aggregate level. However, at
the level of pairwise trades, a typical buyer consumes a limited or a unique amount of
many goods. In particular, buyers are likely to liquidate assets to consume big-ticket
items rather than everyday items.1 The indivisible nature of the good has important
implications on equilibrium by affecting the trading price.
Second, with indivisible goods, agents lose an intensive margin of adjustment during
trade, and hence we allow free entry by buyers, i.e., adjustment on the extensive margin.
Since buyers of the indivisible goods are also asset holders, their participation in the
frictional market endogenously generates the demand for liquidity, and thus we establish
a link between entry and asset price.
Third, the asset that provides liquidity is assumed to be in fixed total supply and it
bears a deterministic exogenous dividend. While previous studies focus exclusively on
positive dividends, we also consider the case of a negative dividend. Apart from being
merely an exercise for theoretical completeness, we think the negative dividend is real,
such as the storage cost of holding gold, an asset and commodity money. While positive
dividend generates a yield, negative dividend puts a cost on asset holders who care about
1Big-ticket items also tend to be durable goods. As an abstraction, we model the indivisible goods
as being perishable. However, in a stationary environment, perishability or durability of the indivisible
goods will not change the asset pricing results.
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its liquidity, hence affecting asset price and equilibrium allocation.
We assume agents use either generalized Nash bargaining or price posting with com-
petitive search to determine the price of the indivisible goods. The former is an ex-post
mechanism mapping the amount of asset holding into outcomes in bilateral trade, while
the latter is an ex-ante mechanism mapping the posted terms of trade into the choice of
asset holding. Under bargaining, buyers commit to bringing the lowest amount of assets
needed to make sellers indifferent between trading or not, and the bargained price does
not depend on the bargaining power or the asset dividend. Price posting with competi-
tive search entails commitment by sellers prior to the trade, and buyers choose their asset
holdings after observing prices.
We show that, under both trading mechanisms, there is a unique equilibrium when
the asset dividend is positive, and in general, multiple equilibria exist for a negative
dividend. Multiplicity is due to the trade-off between the probability of trade and the
opportunity cost of holding assets. When many buyers enter the frictional market, high
participation lowers the probability of trade but also drives up the liquidity demand for
assets. Hence, asset price increases and the cost of holding assets decreases, compensating
buyers for the lower trading probability. The key to this result is the interaction between
free entry and endogenous asset pricing with a negative dividend. For a positive dividend,
the relationship between asset price and the cost of holding assets reverses. The above
trade-off disappears and the equilibrium is unique.
An important implication of indivisibility is that some buyers may choose not to
participate in the frictional market in equilibrium. This is in contrast to models with
divisible goods where buyers always have full entry, as in Lagos and Rocheteau (2007).
With indivisible goods, only the price can adjust but not quantity, and hence the economy
needs a lot of liquidity to support all the buyers trading in the frictional market. This only
happens when the asset dividend is high enough. If the total liquidity provided by assets
is so abundant, all buyers participate and the asset is priced at the fundamental value. If
the asset liquidity is less abundant caused by a smaller dividend, some buyers may start
to drop out of the frictional market. When liquidity is scarce, assets are priced above the
fundamental value to satisfy the liquidity demand, and there is a liquidity premium in
the asset price to reflect its function in facilitating transactions. Eventually, the market
will shut down if the asset dividend is too low to support the frictional trade.
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As is standard in non-convex economies, we also introduce lotteries. While lotteries
serve as a threat of not delivering the goods and help sellers to extract some trading
surplus under bargaining, they make no impact under competitive search. We show that
lotteries are not used in equilibrium since it is mutually beneficial to increase the expected
surplus from trade by raising the trading probability.
1.1 Literature
The New Monetarist environment, based on the seminal work of Lagos and Wright (2005),
has demonstrated that, because of the liquidity function of assets, asset prices can carry
a liquidity premium and move away from fundamental prices. Hence, assets are valued
for both their dividend yield and liquidity service. The case of divisible goods traded for
assets has been studied extensively in, e.g., Wallace (2000), Geromichalos et al. (2007),
and Rocheteau and Wright (2013), but the equilibrium consequences of indivisible goods
traded for divisible assets have been neglected in the literature. One notable exception
is Rabinovich (2017), who studies the trade of indivisible goods with divisible assets
under price posting with random search. He finds a unique equilibrium when assets are
priced at the fundamental value, and multiple equilibria exist when assets are valued
for their liquidity component. Han et al. (2016) study indivisible goods traded with
divisible means of payment in the form of money or credit. As in the current paper, they
analyze equilibrium under bargaining and competitive search. Wang et al. (2019) study
indivisible goods traded with money and credit, and they consider price posting with
random search. However, the cost of holding money or using credit is exogenous, whereas
the cost of holding assets is endogenous.
Indivisibility of goods instead of assets matters and the consequences for equilibria
differ from models with indivisible assets/money as in Shi (1995), Trejos and Wright
(1995), and Wallace (2000).2 Using the Shi-Trejos-Wright framework, Wallace (2000)
considers indivisible assets traded for divisible goods with heterogeneity in positive asset
dividends to obtain an equilibrium liquidity structure of asset yields. Duffi e et al. (2005)
study Over-The-Counter (OTC) markets in a simplified Shi-Trejos-Wright environment
2In Shi-Trejos-Wright (1995) and Wallace (2000), agents cannot accumulate more than one unit of
money. See He and Wright (2019) and Wright et al. (2019) for recent models based on Shi-Trejos-Wright
using assets instead of fiat money.
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with linear utility.
Starting from Geromichalos et al. (2007), there is literature studying assets in fixed
supply as a medium of exchange for consumption in the New Monetarist environment. In
a model with divisible goods and assets, they allow fiat money and real financial assets to
compete as the media of exchange and focus on the equilibrium link between monetary
policy and asset price. Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) also study OTC markets in a New
Monetarist environment with heterogeneous demands for divisible assets. They show that
individual responses of asset demand constitute a fundamental feature of illiquid markets
and are key determinants of trade volume, bid-ask spreads, and trading delays. These
papers focus on the trading frictions in OTC asset markets and the effect of frictions on
asset prices.
Lagos (2011) considers an exchange economy where assets and money are used as the
medium of exchange for a divisible good. Like us, assets are traded in a frictionless and
competitive market, and he studies the determinant of asset prices when assets are the
only medium of exchange. Similarly, Rocheteau and Wright (2013) also consider the case
with the asset being the only medium of exchange. They find multiple stationary equi-
libria, across which asset prices, market participation, output, and welfare are positively
correlated, and they generate a variety of nonstationary equilibria. While we endogenize
the participation of buyers via a market utility condition, they endogenize participation
by free entry of sellers in the frictional market, and hence they do not have a connection
between asset demand and entry. Both Lagos (2011) and Rocheteau and Wright (2013)
only study positive dividend values while we allow the dividend to be positive or negative.3
In the above papers, as in ours, asset prices carry a liquidity premium because they
serve directly as a medium of exchange. A highly related literature, starting fromGeromicha-
los and Herrenbrueck (2016) and followed by Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2017) and
Geromichalos and Jung (2018), define and discuss indirect asset liquidity. In those papers,
assets are viewed as a substitute for money, and asset prices carry a liquidity premium
because agents sell assets for cash in secondary OTC markets. Hence, assets can provide
extra liquidity when money is not enough, and the liquidity function of assets is indirect.
Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2018) study the joint determination of asset supply and
liquidity in a model where financial assets provide liquidity indirectly. A key finding is
3Lagos (2011) further assumes that the dividend value is determined stochastically.
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that an asset’s liquidity depends on the exogenous characteristics of the OTC markets
and the endogenous trading behavior of agents in those markets. While we focus on di-
rect asset liquidity in the current paper, we also show that exogenous asset dividend and
endogenous market participation jointly affect asset prices.
Finally, a version of positive or negative dividend is studied in Nosal et al. (2019),
where they focus on the endogenous formation of middlemen. They assume that holding
inventories of assets entails a positive return, as the positive dividend in our paper, and
holding goods entails a cost, i.e., a negative dividend. They find that multiple equilibria
can only arise with a positive dividend and endogenous market composition. The source
of multiplicity is the interaction between the middleman’s inventory decision and their
probability of trade with producers. While we also find equilibriummultiplicity, it happens
with a negative dividend and endogenous participation. In our paper, multiplicity arises
due to the trade-off between the probability of trade and the opportunity cost of carrying
assets, which depends on the size of participating agents. Such an interaction between
the extensive margin and the carrying cost does not exist in Nosal et al. (2019).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 describe the environment
and stationary equilibrium. In Section 4, we introduce lotteries. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Environment
The environment is based on Rocheteau and Wright (2005).4 Time is discrete and a
continuum of buyers and sellers, with measures N and 1, live forever. Each period,
n ≤ N buyers and all sellers participate in two consecutive markets. The first market is a
frictional decentralized market (DM). In the DM, meetings occur according to a general
meeting technology, which is homogeneous of degree one. Given the buyer-seller ratio n,
which is also the measure of participating buyers in the DM, the meeting probabilities for
sellers and buyers are α(n) and α(n)/n, respectively. Assume α′ > 0, α′′ < 0, α(0) = 0,
limn→∞ α(n) = 1, and limn→0 α′(n) = 1. The second market is a frictionless centralized
market (CM). Agents discount between periods with β ∈ (0, 1), but not across markets
4The original alternating markets framework by Lagos and Wright (2005) has agents receiving a
preference shock in the CM, revealing whether they will be a buyer or a seller in the DM. In Rocheteau
and Wright (2005), buyers are always buyers and sellers are always sellers. All our results hold for both
frameworks.
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within a period, and r = 1/β − 1 is the discount rate.
Both buyers and sellers consume a divisible good in the CM, while only buyers consume
and sellers produce an indivisible good in the DM. Buyers’preferences are given by U(x)−
h+ u1, where x is CM consumption, h is CM labor, u is DM utility from the indivisible
good, and 1 is an indicator function, yielding 1 if trade occurs and 0 otherwise. Let x be
the numeraire, and we assume that x is produced one-to-one from h. Sellers’preferences
are U(x)− h− c1 and c < u is the cost of producing the DM good.
The only asset in the economy is a real asset, a, which is perfectly divisible and
recognizable. It cannot be counterfeited. The total asset supply is fixed at As and at
t = 0 each buyer is endowed with As/N assets. In subsequent periods the asset is traded
competitively in the CM at price ϕ. The real asset generates an exogenously determined
dividend ρ, paid in terms of x in the CM. The dividend ρ can be either positive or negative.
If ρ < 0, it is a storage cost of holding the asset, as in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989).
Because of the trading frictions in the DM, agents cannot commit and there are no
enforcement or punishment mechanisms. Hence, buyers must bring a medium of exchange
into the DM to pay sellers and they use the asset for payments.5 The DM trade implies
a price and quantity bundle (p, q) ∈ P×Q, where P = {0 ≤ p ≤ L} and Q = {0, 1}. We
use L to denote the total liquidity in the economy, with L = (ϕ+ ρ)a being the value of a
buyer’s asset holding in the DM. After a successful trade, sellers acquire assets and then
use them in the subsequent CM.
3 The Model
LetWt (a) and Vt (a) denote the value functions of an agent holding a units of assets when
entering the CM and the DM, respectively. Buyers in the CM obtain
W bt (a) = max
x,h,â
{
U(x)− h+ βV bt+1 (â)
}
st. x = (ϕt + ρ) a+ h− ϕtâ,
5Alternatively, one can assume that agents use assets as collateral to get credit in the DM, as in
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) with the pledgeability parameter to be one. All the results still hold. Lagos
et al. (2017) have shown that these two setups are mathematically equivalent.
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where â is the asset holding carried into the following DM. Buyers participate in the DM
if V bt+1 ≥ 0. Eliminating h from the budget constraint and solving for optimal x∗ yields,
W bt (a) = Σ + (ϕt + ρ) a+ max
â
{
βV bt+1 (â)− ϕtâ
}
, (1)
where Σ = U(x∗)− x∗ and U ′(x∗) = 1. Similarly, for a seller with a we have
W st (a) = Σ + (ϕt + ρ) a+ max
â
{
βV st+1 (â)− ϕtâ
}
. (2)
The buyer’s payoff in the DM is














W bt (a) , (3)
where p is the price of the DM good measured by the numeraire. Using ∂W bt /∂a = ϕt+ρ,
we can simplify (3) as
V bt (a) =
α (n)
n
(u− p) +W bt (a) . (4)
Similarly, for sellers, we have
V st (a) = α (n) (p− c) +W st (a) . (5)
Since sellers do not need to pay in the DM, a necessary condition for them to hold assets
in the DM is ϕt ≤ β(ϕt+1 + ρ). In a steady state equilibrium, it implies ϕ ≤ ρ/r ≡ ϕF ,
and ϕF is the fundamental price of the asset. Hence, sellers only hold assets as a store of
value when they are priced at the fundamental value.
In the next two sections, we analyze the DM trade of an indivisible good and assets
under generalized Nash bargaining and competitive search, and study its implications on
asset pricing and the good’s price in the DM.
3.1 Bargaining
First, we consider the case that the price of the indivisible good is determined by gener-
alized Nash bargaining. In the DM, buyers and sellers face the following problem,
max
p
(u− p)η (p− c)1−η st. p ≤ (ϕt + ρ) a, u− p ≥ 0, p− c ≥ 0. (6)
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When the asset is costly to carry, buyers have no incentives to bring more assets than
p. The feasibility constraint p = (ϕt + ρ)a is binding and hence c ≤ (ϕt + ρ)a ≤ p̄b,
where p̄b = (1− η)u+ ηc is the unconstrained bargaining solution. Any negotiated price
p ∈ [c, p̄b] is a potential bargaining solution.6 Substituting V bt+1 into W bt and a buyer’s
CM value function is
W bt (a) = Σ + (ϕt + ρ) a+ βW
b

















To ease the presentation of the buyer’s problem, we follow Rocheteau and Rodriguez-
Lopez (2014) to define st = ϕt/β(ϕt+1 + ρ)− 1 as the spread of the asset,7 which can be
viewed as the liquidity premium of holding the asset. Then, the buyer’s problem can be
rewritten as




















where a = c/(ϕt+1 +ρ) and ā = [(1−η)u+ηc]/(ϕt+1 +ρ). It is apparent that Ṽ b is strictly
decreasing in â for all values of st > 0. The optimal solution satisfies â(ϕt+1 + ρ) = c.
With bargaining, a buyer can commit to not paying more than the seller’s reservation
price c, as they have the first-mover advantage. The buyer’s surplus from trade decreases
if they carry an amount larger than c, and this is true even in the case of st = 0, when
all the buyers’liquidity need is satisfied and sellers hold the rest of the assets. Hence, the
bargaining outcome p = c is independent of the cost of holding assets. Notice that the
same result holds in a monetary environment in Han et al. (2016). They demonstrate
that when buyers bring real monetary balances into the DM, the bargained price reduces
to p = c even at i = 0. Therefore, under bargaining and indivisible goods, when a buyer
brings a medium of exchange into the DM, he is able to extract all the surplus from trade.
6Using proportional bargaining, i.e., Kalai (1977), for terms of trade yields the same results.
7Using β = 1/(1+ r), rewrite the spread equation as 1+ st = (1+ r)ϕt/(ϕt+1+ρ). This is reminiscent
of the Fisher equation used in monetary models, where 1 + i = (1 + r)φt/φt+1, with i being the nominal
interest rate set by monetary policy and φ the price of money in terms of the numeraire goods in the
CM. Thus, i is the spread on money. With money, i is exogenous; while with assets, the spread s is
endogenous.
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The buyer’s expected value from participating in the DM can now be rewritten as







which is the discounted expected total benefit net of the cost of carrying the asset. The
measure of DM buyers nt ≤ N is determined by a free entry condition, Ṽ b(nt, st) ≥ 0. If
st = 0, the asset is priced at its fundamental value and Ṽ b(nt, st) > 0, ∀nt ≤ N . Hence,
all the buyers participate in the DM. If st > 0, buyers need to pay a cost of holding assets
to enter the DM. When the cost is large enough, buyers start to drop out of the DM.
Hence, Ṽ b(nt, st) = 0 if nt < N and Ṽ b(nt, st) > 0 if nt = N .
We focus our attention on a stationary equilibrium with ϕt = ϕ and st = s, ∀t. To
establish equilibrium existence and uniqueness, we start by defining the aggregate demand,
Ld(s), and the aggregate supply, Ls(s), of liquidity. Under bargaining, Ld(s) = n(s)c and
Ls(s) = (ϕ(s)+ρ)As, where n(s) is determined from the free entry condition (8) and ϕ(s)
is solved from the definition of spread,
ϕ(s) =
βρ(1 + s)
1− β(1 + s) =
ρ(1 + s)
r − s . (9)
When s = 0, we have ϕ = ρ/r ≡ ϕF . The asset is priced fundamentally and does not
carry a liquidity premium. In this case, there is enough liquidity for transactional needs,
i.e., Ls(s) > Ld (s), and the marginal holder of assets is a seller. For s > 0 and s 6= r, we
have
Ld (s) = n (s) c =
ρ (1 + r)
r − s A
s = Ls(s), (10)
and the supply of liquidity is infinitely elastic in the special case of s = r. From (10), we
can solve for














− ρ > ϕF , (13)
and the asset price with full entry is strictly decreasing in ρ and As.
Definition 1 A stationary bargaining equilibrium (SBE) is a list {pb, s, n} such that: (i)
pb solves (6); (ii) s > 0 solves Ls = Ld or s = 0; (iii) n ≤ N solves (8).
To fully describe the equilibrium, we start with two lemmas characterizing the demand
and supply of liquidity. First, define sN as the cutoff spread value at which all buyers
are willing to enter the DM. Let s̄ be the highest value of the spread that gives buyers
zero surplus from DM trade. Furthermore, let ρF , solving (10) with n = N , be the cutoff
dividend value above which assets are priced fundamentally, corresponding to s = 0, i.e.,
no liquidity premium.
Lemma 1 There exist s̄ ≥ r and sN ≤ s̄, such that: (i) for s ≤ sN , ∃! Ld with n = N
and Ld = Nc; (ii) for s ∈ (sN , s̄], ∃! Ld with n < N , Ld = nc and dLd/ds < 0; (iii) for
s > s̄, @ n > 0 and Ld is not well-defined.
Lemma 2 There exists ρF > 0, such that: (i) For ρ < 0 (r < s), Ls is convex and
dLs/ds < 0; (ii) for ρ = 0, Ls is perfectly elastic at s = r; (iii) for ρ ∈ (0, ρF ) (0 < s < r),
Ls is convex and dLs/ds > 0; (iv) for ρ ≥ ρF , Ls is perfectly elastic at s = 0.
The two lemmas are depicted visually in Figure 1. In equilibrium, a positive dividend
value corresponds to a unique spread, while for a negative ρ, there may be multiple s.
Since the asset price is a function of s, as shown in (9), this leads to multiple equilibria
for ρ < 0, as summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 There exists ρ < 0, such that: (i) for ρ ≥ 0 or ρ = ρ < 0, ∃! SBE; (ii)
for ρ ∈ (ρ, 0), ∃ two SBE.
Note that, we can rewrite the participation constraint from (8) and (11) as
Ṽ b(n) = β
α (n)
n








Figure 1: Supply and Demand of Liquidity with Bargaining
where B(n) is the buyer’s gain from DM trade. Evaluating Ṽ b(n) over [0, N ] implies the
existence of a unique ρ, such that for ρ ≥ ρ, the buyers who enter the DM can get a





which is unique and relates to the well-known Hosios (1990) condition for effi cient entry.8
The marginal contribution to the matching process by a buyer equals the flow cost of
entry, or equivalently, the buyer’s share over the discounted total surplus. Therefore, the
endogenous entry of buyers is constrained effi cient at ρ.
Proposition 1 shows that, there exists a unique stationary equilibrium for all positive
dividend values, while for negative ρ, there are exactly two equilibria. To understand the
result, note that from (9), the asset price ϕ is negatively related to s when ρ < 0. When
the equilibrium participation is high (low), a large (small) liquidity demand drives up
(down) the asset price, implying a small (large) spread, making entry less (more) costly.
On the other hand, when the entry level is high (low), buyers face a low (high) probability
of trade, due to the congestion effect in the matching process. This is easily represented
8The Hosios’entry condition is expressed as ε(n) = (1−β)c/[β(u−c)α(n)/n] with ε(n) = α′(n)n/α(n).
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by







with B(n`) > B(nh) and ρAs/n` < ρAs/nh since ρ < 0. Hence, buyers face a trade-off
between the cost of carrying liquidity and the probability of trade. Note that when ρ ≥ 0,
∂ϕ/∂s ≥ 0, and such a trade-off disappears. More (less) participation implies a smaller
(larger) probability of trade and a larger (smaller) spread, and hence the equilibrium is
unique.
A similar trade-off, between the probability of trade and the trading quantity in the
DM, generates multiple equilibria in Rocheteau and Wright (2005). In their monetary
model, there is free entry by sellers and the cost of holding liquidity is exogenously given
at i, the nominal interest rate, while we consider free entry by buyers and s is endoge-
nously determined by the demand and supply of assets. In their economy, as the level of
participation and the probability of trade change in the DM, buyers bargain with sellers
to settle on a different trading quantity, hence making sellers indifferent.
Define ρN by Ṽ b(N) = 0, and it is the cutoff value at which every buyer is willing to
enter the DM. When N is large, in order to have all the buyers participate, we need a
lot of liquidity and hence ρN > 0 needs to be large. When N is small, the total liquidity
needed to support a full-participation equilibrium is also small, and we can have negative
dividend values ρN < 0.
These cutoffs, ρF , ρN , and ρ together characterize intervals of ρ in which liquidity
provided by assets is: (i) so abundant that assets are priced fundamentally with all
buyers participating in the DM, (ii) abundant enough to support full entry by buyers,
however assets are priced above the fundamental value, (iii) less abundant and only able
to support partial participation, or (iv) so scarce that no buyers enter the DM. We now
discuss these different cases and examine the equilibrium effect of changing the dividend
value.
Figure 2 illustrates how the equilibrium asset price, entry, and spread change w.r.t. ρ
when ρN > 0, and the case of ρN < 0 is shown in Figure 3. We mostly focus on ρN > 0
in the following discussion and the same logic applies to ρN < 0. When ρ > ρF , liquidity
is abundant in the economy. Assets are priced at the fundamental value and have no
liquidity premium, i.e., s = 0. Since carrying assets is costless, the marginal asset holder
13
Figure 2: Bargaining Equilibrium, ρN > 0
is a seller. All buyers participate in the DM due to zero holdup cost.
For ρ ∈ (ρN , ρF ), liquidity is relatively scarce but still enough to support full entry by
buyers. The buyer’s liquidity demand drives up the asset price to be above its fundamental
value, and assets become too expensive for sellers to hold since s > 0. Buyers pay a
liquidity premium for carrying assets so that they can trade in the DM. When ρ decreases,
while all buyers still participate, the asset price increases to meet the liquidity demand,
implying a larger liquidity premium. This result echoes a key point in the New Monetarist
literature: liquidity plays a key role in determining the price of an asset.
As ρ decreases further and ρ < ρN , liquidity becomes even more scarce, and buyers
start to drop out of the DM. The congestion effect is now too strong to generate a positive
surplus for full entry. For ρ < 0, the adjustment on the extensive margin leads to two
opposite effects. As ρ decreases, the asset price drops and more buyers choose not to
enter the DM, while the participating buyers enjoy a higher probability of trade. This is
the standard “hot potato”effect: people trade faster as the cost of transaction increases.
On the other hand, there is an incentive for more buyers to participate, which leads to a
higher demand for assets in DM transactions. Consequently, a larger demand will drive
up the asset price, increase the liquidity premium to offset the negative dividend, and
lower the cost of carrying liquidity. This channel works as if more buyers get involved to
14
Figure 3: Bargaining Equilibrium, ρN < 0
share the unpleasant nature of the assets, i.e., a negative dividend, and we name it the
“stinky fish” effect following Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). The smell of the fish is not
desirable but it can provide the liquidity that buyers need in the DM.
Proposition 1 shows that two equilibria exist for ρ < 0, with two levels of participation
n` < nh and two different asset prices ϕn` < ϕnh . In the equilibrium with a high entry nh,
the “hot potato”effect dominates, and both entry and asset price decrease as the dividend
decreases. In the equilibrium with n`, the “stinky fish” effect prevails, and n` and ϕn`
increase as ρ decreases. If ρN < 0, as shown in Figure 3, the total measure of buyers is
small and some negative dividend values can still support full entry, hence nh = N for
ρ ∈ [ρN , 0].
Note that we need both adjustable extensive margin and endogenous liquidity cost
to have the “stinky fish”effect. Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) generates the “hot potato”
effect but not the second one, since agents do not have a participation decision. Liu et
al. (2011) study the “hot potato” effect through the extensive margin, but the cost of
carrying liquidity is exogenous in their model. In fact, the “stinky fish”effect does not
exist in any monetary models, because the cost of holding money is always exogenous and
independent of participation.
Finally, Proposition 2 summarizes the effects of changing ρ in equilibria.
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Proposition 2 In the unique SBE (ρ > 0) and the SBE with high participation (ρ < 0):
(i) for ρ ≥ ρF , we have ∂ϕ/∂ρ > 0, n = N and s = 0; (ii) for ρ ∈ [ρN , ρF ), ∂ϕ/∂ρ < 0,
n = N and ∂s/∂ρ < 0; (iii) for ρ ∈ (ρ, ρN), ∂ϕ/∂ρ > 0, ∂n/∂ρ > 0, and ∂s/∂ρ < 0.
In the SBE with low participation (ρ < 0), for ρ ∈ (ρ, 0), ∂ϕ/∂ρ < 0, ∂n/∂ρ < 0, and
∂s/∂ρ > 0.
3.2 Competitive Search
In this section, we study competitive search equilibrium with price posting.9 Similar to
Moen (1997) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005), there exist a continuum of submarkets,
each identified by masses of sellers posting the same price p ∈ P, with P ⊂ R+ being
the set of prices. After observing all the posted prices, each buyer chooses to enter one
submarket that gives him the maximum surplus. Each seller can only produce for one
buyer in each period. If a seller is visited by multiple buyers, he chooses one with equal
probability. Let n ≤ N be the measure of active buyers in the DM and n(p) be the market
tightness in any submarket associated with p. In what follows we omit p as an argument
in n. As before, the meeting rate for sellers is α(n) and α(n)/n for buyers. We seek a
symmetric competitive search equilibrium, in which homogeneous buyers and sellers make
the same optimal choice and are indifferent across all the submarkets. Without loss of
generality, we can then focus on one submarket to solve for equilibrium, as in Rocheteau
andWright (2005). In equilibrium, the set of submarkets is complete so that no submarket
could be created to make some buyers and sellers better off.
The buyer’s DM value function is now
V bt (p̃, ñ, a) =
α (ñ)
ñ
(u− p̃) +W bt (a) , (14)
where ñ and p̃ are the market tightness and posted price in a local market. From (1) and
(14), the buyers’value function becomes
W bt (a) = Σ + (ϕt + ρ) a+ βW
b

















Let V̄ b ≡ maxp∈P{α (n) /n (u− p) − sp} be the equilibrium expected utility of a buyer
9For an extensive treatment of competitive search, see Wright et al. (2019).
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in the DM.10 Note that we omit the time subscript to focus on stationary equilibrium.
Taking V̄ b as given, a seller solves
Ṽ s(p̃, ñ) = max
p̃,ñ
α (ñ) (p̃− c) st. Ṽ b(p̃, ñ) = α (ñ)
ñ
(u− p̃)− sp̃ ≥ V̄ b, p̃ ≤ (ϕ+ ρ) a. (15)
The constraint Ṽ b(p̃, ñ) = V̄ b determines the beliefs about market tightness n generated
by p on an off-equilibrium path.
Given that prices are observed before buyers choose their asset holdings, we have





α (ñ)u− ñV̄ b




It is easy to show that the necessary condition of the above optimization problem is also
suffi cient. Using V̄ b and the constraint, we derive the seller’s optimal price
p̃c (s, ñ) =
α (ñ) {[1− ε (ñ)]u+ ε (ñ) c}+ ε (ñ) ñsc
α (ñ) + ε (ñ) ñs
, (17)
where ε (n) = α′(n)n/α(n) is the elasticity of the matching rate and ε (n) < 1.11 In
a symmetric equilibrium, the market tightness in different local markets is the same,
i.e., ñ = n, and the optimal price is also the same across different local markets, i.e.,
p̃c(s, ñ) = pc(s, n). The equilibrium n satisfies the free entry condition
α (n)
n
(u− pc)− spc = V̄ b ≥ 0. (18)
Equations (17) and (18) yield pc and n as functions of the asset spread, and we equate
the aggregate demand and supply of liquidity to determine s. The liquidity demand is
Ld(s) = n(s)pc(s, n) and the supply is Ls(s) = (ϕ + ρ)As = (1 + r)ρAs/(r − s). Similar
to the bargaining case, let sN be the cutoff spread value for full entry, s̄ the spread that
10This is the market utility in McAfee (1993), Moen (1997), and Rocheteau and Wright (2005). It is
the maximum expected utility buyers can get in any submarkets.
11Interestingly, if we have divisible goods q ∈ R+ and sellers posting (p, q), we can obtain an addi-
tional optimal condition u′(q)/c′(q)− 1 = s/α(n), as the liquidity premium in Lagos and Wright (2005)
with money. Thus, when asset is priced at its fundamental value, we get the effi cient quantity. Fur-
thermore, solving this equation for s and substituting it into (17) gives pc = {[1− ε (n)]u(q)c′(q) +
ε(n)u′(q)c(q)}/{ε (n)u′(q) + [1− ε(n)]c′(q)}, the standard pricing equation in a monetary environment.
With bargaining, ε(n) is replaced by the buyer’s bargaining power.
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Figure 4: Supply and Demand of Liquidity with Competitive Search
gives buyers zero surplus, and ρF the cutoff dividend value above which assets are priced
fundamentally. Then, Ld and Ls are characterized by the following lemmas and illustrated
in Figure 4.
Lemma 3 There exist s̄ ≥ r and sN ≤ s̄, such that: (i) for s ≤ sN , ∃! Ld with n = N
and dLd/ds < 0; (ii) for generic s ∈ (sN , s̄], ∃! Ld with n < N and dLd/ds < 0; (iii) for
s > s̄, @ n > 0 and Ld is not well-defined.
Lemma 4 There exists ρF > 0, such that: (i) For ρ < 0 (r < s), Ls is convex and
dLs/ds < 0; (ii) for ρ = 0, Ls is perfectly elastic at s = r; (iii) for ρ ∈ (0, ρF ) (0 < s < r),
Ls is convex and dLs/ds > 0; (iv) for ρ ≥ ρF , Ls is perfectly elastic at s = 0.
Note that with bargaining, the trading price in the DM is always equal to c, inde-
pendent of the buyer’s entry and the spread. However, with competitive search, pc is a
function of n and s, causing Ld to be highly nonlinear, and complicates the analysis for
ρ < 0. Next, we are ready to define and characterize the competitive search equilibrium.
Definition 2 A stationary competitive search equilibrium (SCE) is a list {pc, s, n} such
that: (i) given ñ = n, pc satisfies (17); (ii) s > 0 solves Ld(s) = Ls(s) or s = 0; (iii)
ñ = n ≤ N solves (18).
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Proposition 3 There exists ρ < 0, such that: (i) for ρ ≥ 0, ∃! SCE; (ii) for ρ ∈ [ρ, 0], ∃
SCE.
Similar to the bargaining case, there is a unique equilibrium for ρ ≥ 0. For ρ < 0,
buyers face a similar trade-off between the probability of trade and the opportunity cost
of holding assets, and there may exist multiple equilibria. We cannot prove that there
are exactly two equilibria, since pc changes with respect to n and s and Ld can be highly
nonlinear under competitive search, while with bargaining, Ld is a straight line and pb is
the seller’s reservation value, independent of the spread and the market tightness in the
DM.
With competitive search, sellers post prices to direct the buyers’search behavior and
serve as a coordinating device. Hence, in the monetary economy with competitive search
in Rocheteau and Wright (2005) and Han et al. (2016), there is a unique equilibrium.
However, while the cost of holding money is an exogenous policy variable in their economy,
the cost of holding assets is endogenously determined in our model. For a given s, one
can show that the seller’s optimal price is unique and there is a unique optimal entry.
Then, since s is endogenously determined by Ls = Ld, there may exist multiple equilibria
with different s, each generating the same payoff for buyers and sellers, respectively. For
example, one equilibrium may feature a high probability of trade and a large spread for
carrying assets, while another has a low probability and a small cost of liquidity, both
giving buyers the same equilibrium expected utility and making sellers indifferent between
posting two prices. In this situation, competitive search still serves as a coordinating
device given the spread, but there are equilibria featuring different s.
Like the bargaining case, we define the cutoff dividend value for full entry as ρN ,
solving V̄ b = 0. As we discuss the comparative statics in the following paragraphs, we
focus on the case of ρN > 0, which is illustrated in Figure 5, and Figure 6 presents the
case of ρN < 0. Similar to the bargaining case, the cutoffs of ρN , ρF , and ρ define intervals
of ρ, featuring equilibria with different amount of liquidity.
For ρ > ρF , the total liquidity provided by assets is so abundant that all buyers
enter the DM. The asset is priced at the fundamental value and the asset price ϕ is
monotonically increasing with the dividend. As ρ decreases and becomes less than ρF but
still greater than ρN , the total liquidity is still enough to support full entry by buyers, and
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Figure 5: Competitive Search Equilibrium, ρN > 0
the asset carries a liquidity premium in its price. In this case, as ρ decreases, the total
supply of liquidity Ls also decreases, and hence s increases, as one can see from 4. The
change of ϕ, however, is ambiguous for the following reason. On the one hand, a smaller
ρ implies a lower liquidity supply. On the other hand, as ρ decreases, the cost of holding
assets increases, implying a lower pc in the DM, and the total liquidity demand also drops.
Both Ls and Ld change in the same direction, and the change of ϕ due to decreasing ρ is
unclear. With bargaining, we always have pB = c and the liquidity demand is a constant
with full entry. Hence, as ρ decreases, the asset price increases monotonically to fill in
the liquidity gap caused by a lower ρ.
As the dividend decreases even further, there is not enough liquidity to support full
entry and some buyers drop out of the DM. The cost of holding assets increases, and the
change in asset price is still ambiguous. For ρ < 0, pc depends on both s and n, making
it impossible to fully characterize Ld. Now both the “hot potato”and the “stinky fish”
effects kick in. Under general parameter values, either one may be the dominant force,
and the comparative statics of ϕ, n, and s are ambiguous. Finally, the DM shuts down
when ρ < ρ. The analysis is similar in the case of ρN < 0, and the adjustment on the
extensive margin happens at a later time. In the following, Proposition 4 summarizes the
effects of changing ρ in equilibria.
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Figure 6: Competitive Search Equilibrium, ρN < 0
Proposition 4 In the SCE: (i) for ρ ≥ ρF , we have ∂ϕ/∂ρ > 0, n = N , and s = 0;
(ii) for ρ ∈ [ρN , ρF ) and ρ ≥ 0, n = N , ∂s/∂ρ < 0, and ∂ϕ/∂ρ is ambiguous; (iii) for
ρ ∈ (ρ, ρN) and ρ ≥ 0, ∂n/∂ρ > 0, ∂s/∂ρ < 0, and ∂ϕ/∂ρ is ambiguous; (iv) for ρ < 0,
∂n/∂ρ, ∂s/∂ρ, and ∂ϕ/∂ρ are ambiguous.
4 Lotteries
Following Berentsen et al. (2002), we introduce lotteries in our non-convex economy with
indivisible goods and study the effect of lotteries on equilibrium. LetE = P×{0, 1} denote
the space of trading events, andW the Borel σ-algebra. Define a lottery to be a probability
measure ω on the measurable space (E,W). We can write ω(p, q) = ωq(q)ωp|q(p) where
ωq(q) is the marginal probability measure of q and ωp|q(p) the conditional probability
measure of p on q. As shown in Berentsen et al. (2002), we can restrict attention to
τ = Pr{q = 1} and 1− τ = Pr{q = 0}, and ωp|0(p) = ωp|1(p) = 1. Randomization is only
useful on q because Q is non-convex. Hence, τ ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that the good is
produced and traded.
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With lotteries, the generalized Nash bargaining problem becomes
max
p,τ
(τu− p)η (p− τc)1−η st. p ≤ (ϕ+ ρ) a, τ ≤ 1, τu ≥ p, and p ≥ τc
and its solution is characterized by the following lemma:









if (ϕ+ ρ)a > p̄b
((ϕ+ ρ)a, 1) if pb ≤ (ϕ+ ρ)a ≤ p̄b(
(ϕ+ ρ)a, (ϕ+ ρ)a/pb
)
if c ≤ (ϕ+ ρ)a < pb
(0, 0) if (ϕ+ ρ)a < c
where p̄b = (1− η)u+ ηc and pb = uc/(ηu+ (1− η)c).
The buyer’s CM value function now becomes
W bt (a) = Σ + (ϕt + ρ)a+ βW
b
t+1 (0) + βmax
â
v (â) ,
where v (â) = (τ bu− pb)α(n)/n− s(ϕt+1 + ρ)â. Proposition 5 characterizes equilibria.
Proposition 5 There exists ρ < 0, such that: (i) for ρ ≥ 0 or ρ = ρ < 0, ∃! SBE with
lotteries; (ii) for ρ ∈ (ρ, 0), ∃ two SBE with lotteries; (iii) pb = pb and τ b = 1 in (i) and
(ii).
Since τ b affects the expected surplus from the DM trade, i.e., τ b(u − c), it is in the
best interest of both buyers and sellers to negotiate the trading probability as high as
possible. Hence, lotteries are never used in equilibrium and buyers bring just enough
assets to achieve the maximum expected surplus from trade at τ b = 1. In equilibrium, pb
and τ b do not change with respect to ρ, and the buyer’s asset holding is not affected by
the spread s. Compared to the case of bargaining without lotteries, we get a continuum
of two equilibria for ρ ∈ (ρ, 0), since the trade-off between the probability of trade and
the cost of carrying liquidity still exists. Lotteries do not lead to equilibrium uniqueness.
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Finally, introducing lotteries to competitive search, the price posting problem becomes
Ṽ s(p, n, τ) = max
p,τ ,n
α (n) (p− τc)
st. Ṽ b(p, n, τ) =
α (n)
n
(τu− p)− sp ≥ V̄ b, p ≤ (ϕ+ ρ) a, τ ≤ 1.
The following proposition shows that lotteries are not used in competitive search equi-
librium either, since sellers want to post τ c = 1 to maximize their expected profits and
buyers’expected market utility.
Proposition 6 There exists ρ < 0, such that: (i) for ρ ≥ 0, ∃! SCE with lotteries; (ii)
for ρ ∈ [ρ, 0], ∃ SCE with lotteries; (iii) τ c = 1 holds in (i) and (ii).
5 Conclusion
This paper studies an economy where divisible real assets play an essential role in providing
liquidity for transactions. Agents acquire assets and then use them as the medium of
exchange to trade an indivisible good in a frictional market. The asset is valued both for
providing liquidity and its real dividend. The dividend value may be positive or negative.
We consider two trading mechanisms, generalized Nash bargaining and price posting with
competitive search. We allow free entry by the buyers of the indivisible goods, who are
on the demand side of asset liquidity.
Under both trading mechanisms, we find that the equilibrium is unique if the dividend
is positive, and there may exist multiple equilibria if ρ < 0 since buyers then face a trade-
offbetween the opportunity cost of holding assets and the probability of trade. To compare
with the equilibrium result in a monetary economy, the key difference is that the cost of
carrying liquidity is endogenously determined by the supply and demand of assets, and
the latter is affected by free entry.
Indivisibility matters, especially when the terms of trade in the goods market are de-
termined by bargaining. Indivisibility affects the bargaining outcome because it isolates
the price of goods from the cost of carrying assets, hence the dividend value, and the
number of buyers. The bargained price gives sellers no surplus from trade. Introducing
lotteries does not change the independence of the price, but sellers are able to extract
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a positive surplus. Price posting with competitive search serves as a coordinating de-
vice. It reestablishes the link between trading price and asset dividend as well as entry.
Introducing lotteries again does not change the equilibrium results.
Since assets serve as the medium of exchange in this economy, the asset price always
adjusts to create enough liquidity supply to satisfy the demand. Hence, depending on
the different levels of liquidity abundance in the economy, the model predicts different
relationships between asset price and asset dividend. While we have focused on stationary
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Proof of Lemma 1. Given buyers’participation constraint, n = N if α(n)
n
(u− c)−sc >




, then given s ≤ sN , for all n < N , α(n)
n
(u− c) − sc > 0,
contradiction. Hence, n = N and (i). Define s̄ = u−c
c
, then ∀n ∈ (0, N ], for s > s̄, @ n
such that α(n)
n
(u− c) − sc ≥ 0, hence (iii). For s ∈ (sN , s̄], α(n)
n




u−c < 0, implying dL
d/ds < 0, and hence (ii).
Proof of Lemma 2. If assets are priced at the fundamental value, all buyers participate
in the DM and s = 0. Let ρF = (1 − β)c/A. If ρ ≥ ρF , then ∀ n, (ϕ + ρ)As/n ≥
(ϕF + ρ)As/n ≥ ρFA/(1 − β) = c. The liquidity need for assets is satisfied and the
marginal holders of assets only care about the store of value function of assets. Then,
ϕ = ϕF and s = 0, hence (iv). If ρ = 0, the cost of holding assets is s = r, hence (ii).
Otherwise, ϕ = (1 + s)ρ/(r − s), then substitute s into the liquidity supply and Ls =
(1+r)ρAs/(r−s), with ∂Ls/∂s = (1+r)ρAs/(r−s)2 and ∂2Ls/∂s2 = 2(1+r)ρAs/(r−s)3.
It is straightforward to check ∂Ls/∂s > 0 and ∂2Ls/∂s2 > 0 for ρ ∈ (0, ρF ), i.e., 0 < s < r,
hence (iii). For ρ < 0, ∂Ls/∂s < 0 and ∂2Ls/∂s2 > 0, and hence (i) holds.
Proof of Proposition 1. Figure 1 illustrates the liquidity demand and the liquidity
supply with bargaining. There may exist a unique or multiple intersections of demand
and supply, and we need to discuss different cases. For ρ ≥ ρF , Ls and Ld don’t have an
intersection for all s > 0. Ls ≥ Ld. Therefore, sellers hold some assets too. The equilib-
rium is unique. For all ρ < ρF , all equilibria satisfy Ls = Ld and the buyers’participation
constraint. For ρ > 0, we have dLs/ds > 0 and dLd/ds ≤ 0, hence the equilibrium is
unique. For ρ = 0, the asset economy is equivalent to the fiat money economy with
zero money growth rate, and we show the uniqueness in Han et al. (2016) Proposition










(n) < 0, then f (n) has a unique global maximum point on the support [0, N ].
Now define ρ = −maxn∈[0,N ] f(n). For ρ < ρ ≤ 0, f(n) < −ρ ∀n > 0, the buyers’
participation constraint doesn’t hold and the DM shuts down, i.e., Ls = Ld will never
hold. For ρ = ρ, the equilibrium is unique because of the unique n which maximizes f(n).
Hence (i). For ρ ∈ (ρ, 0), there are two roots satisfying f (n) = −ρ, denoted by nl and
nh. Without lose of generality, let nl < nh. It is straightforward to show nl < N , then
n = nl, which satisfies f (nl) = −ρ, and Ls = Ld is an equilibrium. We focus on the other
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root nh. If nh ≥ N , we have f (N) ≥ f(nh) = −ρ. Then n = N and Ls = Ld is the other
equilibrium; otherwise, n = nh < N and Ls = Ld is the other equilibrium. In summary,
for ρ ∈ (ρ, 0), there are two equilibria with n = nl and n = max{nh, N}. Hence (ii).
Proof of Proposition 2. For the unique equilibrium or the equilibrium with higher
participation, we have shown that there exists a cutoff ρF such that ρFAs = (1 − β)cN .
Then, ∀ρ > (1 − β)cN/As, we have ϕ = ϕF , n = N , and s = 0; hence (i). Define ρN by





β (u− c)− (1− β) c
]
. For ρ ∈ [ρN , ρF ), f (n) > −ρ ∀
n < N , and hence n = N is a possible candidate equilibrium. If ρ < ρN , all equilibria
should satisfy n < N . For ρ ∈ [ρN , ρF ), n = N and ϕ = cN/As − ρ, then ∂ϕ/∂ρ < 0 and
∂s/∂ρ < 0; hence (ii). For ρ ∈ [ρ, ρN), because of the concavity of f (n), ∂s/∂ρ < 0 and
thus ∂ϕ/∂ρ > 0 and ∂n/∂ρ > 0; hence (iii). For the equilibrium with lower participation
and ρ ∈ (ρ, 0), because of the concavity of f (n), we have ∂ϕ/∂ρ < 0 and ∂n/∂ρ < 0, and
∂s/∂ρ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. To prove that Ld is a well-defined function for s ≤ s̄, it is suffi cient
to show that n > 0 exists and is unique. Substituting pc into (18) gives αε(u − c)s +
α2ε(u−c)/n = α[(1−ε)u+εc]s+εncs2. Define h(n, s) = αε(u−c)s+α2ε(u−c)/n−α[(1−
ε)u+εc]s−εncs2. Given any n ∈ (0, N ], h(n, s) = 0 is a quadratic function in s, which has
two real solutions with opposite signs. The positive solution s+, satisfying h(n, s+) = 0, is
an implicit function of n, s+(n). Let s+(0) = limn→0 s+(n) <∞, and s+(0) is continuous
on [0, N ]. Define sN by h(N, sN) = 0 and s̄ = maxn∈[0,N ] s+(n). For s < sN , h(N, s) > 0
hence n = N . Then Ld = Npc(N, s) is unique, and dLd/ds = Ndpc(N, s)/ds < 0,
hence (i). For s > s̄, h(n, s) < 0 ∀n, and the free-entry condition does not hold due to
α(n)(u− pc)/n− spc < 0, hence (iii).
Regarding (ii), for s ≤ s̄, h(n, s) = 0 always holds for some n > 0, and Ld exists.
To show that Ld is generically unique and monotone, consider Ld = npc and dLd/ds =
∂Ld/∂s+ (∂Ld/∂n)(∂n/∂s). Given h(n, s) = 0, we have Ld = α(n)nu/[α(n) + sn], hence
∂Ld/∂s < 0 and ∂Ld/∂n > 0. Then, it is suffi cient to show that n is generically unique
and ∂n/∂s < 0. We claim that although there might be multiple n which maximize
Ṽ s(ñ, s), n is still unique and ∂n/∂s < 0 for generic s. To see this, suppose Ṽ s(n1, s) =
Ṽ s(n2, s) = maxñ Ṽ
s(ñ, s) and n2 > n1. Then, n1 is the minimum n maximizing Ṽ s(ñ, s),
and Ṽ s(n1, s) > Ṽ s(ñ, s), ∀ñ < n1. For ε > 0 small enough, Ṽ s(n1, s + ε) > Ṽ s(ñ, s + ε)
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also holds for n < n1 due to continuity. If ∂2π/∂s∂n < 0, then Ṽ s(n1, s+ε) > Ṽ s(n2, s+ε),
and the global maximizer is a unique n in the neighborhood of n1. Next, we need to show




(α + sñ) [(u− c)α′ − sc]− s (1− ε) [(u− c)α− sñc]
(α + sñ)2 /α
.
Define T (s) = (α + sñ)[(u − c)α′ − sc] − s(1 − ε)[(u − c)α − sñc], and T ′(s) = ñ[(u −
c)α′− sc]− (α+ sñ)c− (1− ε)[(u− c)α− sñc] + sñc(1− ε). Since Tñ=n = 0, ∂2π/∂s∂n =
T ′(s)/[(α + sn)2/α]. With α(u− c)− snc > 0, we have
T ′ñ=n(s) =
− [α (u− c)− snc] (1− ε)α− c (α + sn) (α + snε)
α + sn
< 0.
Therefore, ∂2Ṽ s/∂s∂n < 0 holds. In addition, arg maxñ Ṽ s(ñ, s) might have more than
one solution for some s ≥ sNC , but the set of such asset spreads has measure zero,
hence (ii). Finally, we prove s̄ ≥ r by contradiction. Suppose s̄ < r, then for s1 =
(rϕ1−ρ1)/(ϕ1+ρ1) ∈ (s̄, r), ρ1 > 0 and n1 = 0. Hence, ϕ1 = ϕF1 and s1 = 0, contradicting
s1 > s̄ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. If assets are priced at the fundamental value, then all buyers
participate in the DM and s = 0. Let ρF = (1− β)pcN,s=0/A. If ρ ≥ ρF , the average asset
holding satisfies (ϕ + ρ)As/n ≥ (ϕF + ρ)As/n ≥ ρFA/(1 − β) = pcN,s=0. The liquidity
need for assets is satisfied and the marginal holders of assets only care about the store of
value function. Hence, ϕ = ϕF and s = 0. If ρ = 0, the cost of holding assets is s = r.
If ρ < ρF and ρ 6= 0, substitute s into the liquidity supply and Ls = (1 + r)ρAs/(r − s),
with ∂Ls/∂s = (1 + r)ρAs/(r − s)2 and ∂2Ls/∂s2 = 2(1 + r)ρAs/(r − s)3. It is easy to
check ∂Ls/∂s > 0 and ∂2Ls/∂s2 > 0 for ρ ∈ (0, ρF ), and for ρ < 0, ∂Ls/∂s < 0 and
∂2Ls/∂s2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Figure 4 illustrates the liquidity demand and the liquidity
supply with competitive search. There may exist a unique or multiple intersections of
demand and supply, and we need to discuss different cases. For ρ ≥ ρF , a downward-
sloping Ld and a perfectly elastic Ls ensure the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium s
with n = N , hence (i). For ρ = 0, assets are equivalent to money with zero inflation, and
the proof follows Proposition 5 in Han et al. (2016). For ρ ∈ (0, ρF ), Ld and Ls intersect
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once and there exists a unique equilibrium. For ρ < 0, s̄ ≥ r according to Lemma 3.
If s̄ = r, @ non-degenerate equilibrium; if s̄ > r, Ld and Ls may have more than one
intersection, hence there are more than one candidate equilibrium. Given the equilibrium





α (n (s))u− n (s) V̄ b




Given different values of s satisfying the first-order condition, there could be more than
one s maximizing seller’s profit. Hence, uniqueness does not exist in this region. Next,
we need to show the existence of ρ. If s̄ = r, ρ = 0. Consider s̄ > r. For s ∈ (r, s̄), ρ < 0,
∂Ls/∂ρ = (1 + r)As/(r− s) < 0, and Ld is constant. Hence, ∀s ∈ (r, s̄), ∃! ρ(n) such that
Ls(ρ) = Ld, and define ρ = mins∈[r,s̄] ρ(s) < 0. For ρ < ρ, Ls > Ld, and there exists no
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4. We know ρF satisfies ρFAs = (1− β)N [1 − ε(N)]u +
(1− β)Nε(N)c. For ρ ≥ ρF , we have s = 0, implying ϕ = ϕF and n = N ; hence (i).
And we know ρN = (1− β) pc(sN , N) − β[u − pc(sN , N)]α (N) /N , for ρ ∈ (ρN , ρF ), we
have n = N and ∂s/∂ρ < 0 because Ld is downward slopping and Ls shifts upward
with increasing ρ. However, ∂ϕ/∂ρ is ambiguous, hence (ii). For ρ ∈ [ρ, ρN) and ρ ≥ 0,
∂s/∂ρ < 0 and ∂n/∂ρ > 0 because Ld is downward slopping and Ls shifts upward with
increasing ρ. However, ∂ϕ/∂ρ is ambiguous. Hence (iii). For ρ < 0, ∂s/∂ρ, ∂n/∂ρ, and
∂ϕ/∂ρ are ambiguous because of the multiplicity, hence (iv).
Proof of Lemma 5. Using λ1 and λ2 for the multipliers on the asset constraint and
the lotteries constraint gives the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
0 = −η (τu− p)η−1 (p− τc)1−η + (1− η) (τu− p)η (p− τc)−η − λ1 (19)
0 = ηu (τu− p)η−1 (p− τc)1−η − c (1− η) (τu− p)η (p− τc)−η − λ2 (20)
0 = λ1 [(ϕ+ ρ)a− p]
0 = λ2 (1− τ) .
It is straightforward to check that if λ1 = 0, p = τ bp̄b. Substituting this into (20) implies
λ2 > 0, and hence τ b = 1. In order to support τ b = 1, buyer needs to bring enough
asset to the DM trade, i.e., (ϕ + ρ)a > p̄b. On the other hand, if λ2 = 0, τ b = pb/pb.
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Substituting this into (19) implies λ1 > 0 and pb = (ϕ + ρ)a. In order to satisfy τ b < 1,
we need (ϕ+ ρ)a < pb. If both λ1 and λ2 are greater than zero, pb = (ϕ+ ρ)a and τ b = 1.
λ1 > 0 implies (ϕ+ρ)a < p̄b, and λ2 > 0 implies (ϕ+ρ)a > pb. Finally, the seller certainly
does not trade if he meets a buyer with (ϕ+ ρ)a < c.
Proof of Proposition 5. First, buyers do not want to bring (ϕt+1 + ρ)â > p̄b,
since additional assets do not affect the surplus from trade. Second, they do not bring
(ϕt+1 + ρ)â < c, for no trade. Next, for (ϕt+1 + ρ)â ∈ (pb, p̄b), v′(â) = −(ϕt+1 + ρ)[s +
α(n)/n] < 0, and buyers want to choose (ϕt+1 + ρ)â = pb. For (ϕt+1 + ρ)â ∈ (c, pb),
v′(â) = (ϕt+1 +ρ) [α(n)η(u− c)/nc− s], and the sign of v′(â) depends on the value of the
spread s. Since α(n)(u−pb)/n−spb = pb[α(n)η(u−c)/nc−s], v′(â) shares the same sign as
α(n)(u−pb)/n−spb. Suppose v′(â) < 0, buyers choose τ b = 0 and there is no equilibrium
with an open DM. If v′(â) > 0, buyers of measure n in the DM choose (ϕt+1 + ρ)â = p
b.
The cutoff spread satisfying v′(â) = 0 is given by α(n)(u−pb)/n−spb = 0, which is equiv-
alent to the participation constraint n[α(n)β(u−pb)/n−(1−β)pb]/As = g(n) ≥ −ρ. Since
g′′(n) < 0, let ρ = −max
n
g(n), ρF = (1−β)pb/A, and ρN = [(1−β)pb−βα(N)(u−pb)/N ]/A.
For ρ ≥ ρ, all equilibria feature pb = pb and τ b = 1. If ρ ≥ ρF , then ϕ = ϕF ; otherwise
ϕ > ϕF . If ρ ≥ ρN , then n = N ; otherwise n < N . The rest of the proof on equilibrium
stability follows directly from Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 6. We need to check that sellers always post τ c = 1 and the rest
of the proof follows Proposition 3. Let λ be the multiplier for τ , and the FOCs are
0 = ε (ñ) (p− τc)− α (ñ) [1− ε (ñ)] (τu− p)





α (ñ) + ñs
− α (ñ) c− λ
]
, (22)
0 = λ (1− τ) .
Given the buyer’s optimal participation ñ = n and (21), we have
pc =
α (n) {[1− ε (n)] τu+ ε (n) τc}+ ε (n)nsτc
α (n) + ε (n)ns
.
Solve for λ from (22), and we need λ = α(n)(u − c) − cns > 0 to assure τ c = 1. Since
pc/τ > c ∀τ , α(n)(u− c)− cns > α(n)(u− pc/τ)− nspc/τ ≥ 0. The last inequality is the
buyer’s participation constraint in the DM, which holds if ρ ≥ ρ and n > 0.
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